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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUER 
1. Was Mr. Arroyo's ''consent" voluntarily given and not the 
result of duress or coercion, express or implied? 
2. Did the trial judge reach the issue of the voluntariness 
of the Mr- Arroyo's "consent" to search hi$ truck? 
3. Even assuming that Mr. Arroyo voluntarily consented to 
the search of his truck, did the State sustain its burden of 
establishing a break in the causal connection between the illegal 
pretext stop and the evidence subsequently obtained from Mr. 
Arroyo? 
STATEMENT OF THE CA$E 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by this 
Court on February 15, 1989. Originally th£ State of Utah filed 
an Interlocutory Appeal challenging the District Court's 
suppression of cocaine seized after a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
stopped Jose Francisco Arroyo for an alleged traffic offense. 
The trial court found the stop of Mr. Arroyo's vehicle to be a 
pretext stop which violated Mr. Arroyo's Fcburth Amendment 
Rights. This court reversed that decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent relies upon the Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Ray M. Harding (a copy of which is included with the 
Appellant's brief) and agrees with the facts set forth in the 
Court's opinion denominated as such under the heading of 
"Facts"• However, the Respondent disputes this Court's assertion 
that Mr. Arroyo, through his counsel stipulated that he had 
consented to the search of his vehicle. Respondent's counsel 
entered into no such stipulation concerning either the consent or 
the voluntariness of Mr. Arroyo's consent. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent's counsel never stipulated that Arroyo had 
consented to the search of his vehicle. The trial court and 
Respondent's counsel, not having the benefit of this Court's 
ruling in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
both misunderstood the law on attenuation of taint, and as a 
result, neither the issue of consent or the issue of attenuation 
of the taint were ever considered by the trial court. The record 
is incomplete on these issues and a remand to the trial court for 
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law is warranted. 
-2-
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
Reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established 
the standard for granting a Petition for Rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made. 
We must be convinced that the Court failed to consider 
some material point in the case, or that it erred in 
its conclusions . . . . 
11 P. at 512 
Later, in Cummings v. Nielson 129 P. 619 (1913), this court 
added: 
To make an application for rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing Petitions for Rehearings in proper 
cases. When this Court, however, has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued, or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we have 
based the decision on some wroncy principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially effects the result .i. . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a Petition for a 
Rehearing should be properly fiied, and if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized 
by this Court. 
Id at 624. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying 
these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is properly before 
the Court and should be granted. In its opinion in State v. 
Arroyo, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 88Q062-CA, (filed 
February 15, 1989), this Court committed rtianifest error in that 
the decision to reverse the trial court (a^ distinguished from 
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remanding the matter), was based upon the erroneous assumption 
that the Respondent's counsel stipulated that Mr. Arroyo had 
consented to the search of his vehicle and that Respondent's 
counsel then sought to take advantage of the State and the Court 
by objection to an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
"consent" search. Additionally, this Court overlooked applicable 
law on the attenuation of the Wong Sun taint issue. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL NEVER STIPULATED THAT MR. ARROYO HAD 
EITHER CONSENTED OR VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF 
HIS VEHICLE. 
In reversing the trial court's decision suppressing the 
evidence seized from Mr. Arroyo's truck, this Court first 
concluded that Respondent's counsel had stipulated that Mr. 
Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle. Respondent's 
counsel did not enter into any such stipulation. Additionally, 
because this Court concluded that Respondent's counsel had 
mislead both the State and the Court, this Court apparently 
concluded that an appropriate sanction for counsel's misconduct 
was to find facts which were never considered by the trial 
court. Accordingly, this Court found the fact and made the 
conclusion of law that the consent was voluntarily given. With 
all due respect to this Court, this conclusion and the decision 
to reverse the trial court's suppression order are unwarranted 
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and unsupported by the record since Respondent's counsel entered 
into no such stipulation. 
It is true that Respondent's counsel erroneously challenged 
only the propriety of Mr. Arroyo's initial stop. The additional 
issues of the 1) voluntariness of Mr. Arroyo's consent and 2) 
the question of whether the government could establish a break in 
the causal connection between the pretext stop and the evidence 
obtained from the "consent" should also have been addressed at 
the suppression hearing. However, counsel's oversight in this 
regard was just that. No malice or devious intent was conjured 
up by Respondent's counsel. Instead, Respondent's counsel 
incorrectly believed that the trial court'^ inquiry ended with 
the determination of whether Trooper Mange^son's stop of Mr. 
Arroyo was unconstitutional. Although State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 
972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), has instructed counsel and the court 
that a search conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent purges 
the taint from a prior illegal stop, that case was not decided 
until after the suppression hearing held ih the lower court. 
This Court misapprehended the facts when it concluded that 
Respondent's counsel had entered into a stipulation that Mr. 
Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle. When the 
State's counsel endeavored to probe the question of whether Mr. 
Arroyo's "consent" was voluntary, Respondent's counsel objected 
on the basis that the only relevant issue was whether the 
original stop was a pretext stop. The tri&l court agreed and 
sustained the objection. However, Respondent's counsel did not 
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at that time, or at any other time, stipulate that Mr. Arroyo had 
consented to the search of the vehicle. In fact, the only 
representation made in that regard was made by the State's 
counsel, and not the Respondent's counsel. The colloquy was as 
follows: 
Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle. I asked for a 
driver's license. I made as many observations about the 
vehicle as I could. 
Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney): Describe what 
you observed. Answer: I observed . . . 
Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think 1 would 
object to any further inquiry at this point. My motion only 
goes to the propriety and the lawfulness of the stop. And I 
think that is what . . . 
The Court: Was this a consent search? 
Mr. Eyre: Yes, sir. 
The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes strictly 
to the stop. 
Mr. Eyre: O.k. Question: Anything else about the stop 
that you recall that you have not previously testified to? 
Answer: I don't believe so. 
Page 40, transcript of Suppression Hearing. 
Thus, the record itself clearly discloses that it was Mr. 
Eyre, the Juab County Attorney, who asserted to the Court that 
the search was a consent search. Mr. Eyre has stipulated in an 
affidavit attached hereto as Appendix I that Respondent's counsel 




THE TRIAL JUDGE NEVER REACHED THE CONSENT ISSUE. 
Both the Respondent's counsel and the trial judge 
erroneously believed that evidence which would not have been 
discovered "but for" the prior illegal stop was per se 
inadmissible. Because the Respondent's counsel and the trial 
court were wrong in this regard, the trial court never reached 
the consent issue. Absolutely no facts weire presented in 
connection with the consent issue. 
This Court apparently placed special significance on the 
trial court's Finding of Fact 18. That Finding of Fact states, 
"The trooper requested permission to search the Defendant's 
vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search of the 
vehicle." Based on this Finding of Fact, this Court stated, "the 
trial judge specifically found that Arroyo consented to the 
search of his truck, and there was nothing in the record to 
contradict this finding." By this statement, this Court seems to 
have concluded that the trial court considered the consent search 
issue. It did not. Respondent submits th&t the trial court 
found nothing more in Finding of Fact 18 than that Trooper 
Mangelson requested permission to search Mr. Arroyo's truck and 
Mr. Arroyo agreed or consented. Thus, the trial court entered no 
conclusion of law concerning either consent or the voluntariness 
of said consent. 
The case at bar is not unlike Sierra. In Sierra, this Court 
remanded the matter for the trial court to make sufficient 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues of whether 
1) Sierra's consent was voluntary and 2) whether the evidence was 
procured by exploitation of the primary illegality or instead v/as 
obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the initial 
illegal stop. In Sierra,, this Court concluded a remand was in 
order because so many factual issues were unresolved and 
undeveloped in the record. In the instant matter these same 
deficiencies in the record exist. The Respondent submits that 
just as in Sierra this case should be remanded to the trial court 
for a further determination of both the voluntary consent and 
attenuation of taint issues. 
Point III 
EVEN IF IT IS IGNORED THAT THERE WAS NO STIPULATION AS TO 
CONSENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT OF 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT, THE STATE IS STILL NOT ENTITLED TO A 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURTfS SUPPRESSION ORDER BECAUSE THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A BREAK IN THE 
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL PRETEXT STOP AND THE 
EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED WAS NEVER CONSIDERED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Even it is assumed contrary to the record that the trial 
court did consider the consent issue, the admissibility of the 
challenged evidence cannot be correctly decided unless the trial 
court found from the evidence a break in the chain of illegality 
and that a finding was made that Mr. Arroyo's "consent" was his 
free and voluntary act. For the reasons already stated, this 
issue was never reached by the trial court. 
In Respondent's brief, Mr. Arroyo cited numerous decisions 
where a finding of consent failed to establish a break in the 
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chain of illegality. Those decisions were not discussed at 
length in Respondent's brief. However, because this Court ruled 
"that although the original illegal stop was unconstitutional, 
Arroyo's subsequent voluntary consent purged the taint from the 
initial illegality . . .", Respondent believes it may be 
pertinent to point out that in many cases $. finding of voluntary 
consent was inadequate to purge the primary illegality of the 
Wong Sun taint. 
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (19$2), a suspect's 
consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by his illegal 
detention and was ineffective to justify the search of his two-
suit cases. Royer was approached at an aifport by detectives who 
asked for his airline ticket and driver's license. Without 
returning the ticket and license the detectives asked Royer to 
accompany them to a small room. After obtaining Royerfs luggage 
from the airline without his consent, he then produced a key and 
unlocked one suitcase. Drugs were found in that suitcase. Royer 
then indicated to the detectives that he did not know the 
combination to the lock of the second suitcase. When asked if he 
objected to the detective opening the suitcase, Royer said, "no, 
go ahead," and did not object when the detective further 
explained the suitcase might have to be pried open. The trial 
court concluded that Royer's consent to the search was "freely 
and voluntarily given". The Florida District Court of Appeal 
held, inter alia, that "at the time his consent to search was 
obtained, he was unlawfully confined and consent to search was 
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therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful confinement." 
460 U.S. at 495. The Florida Court of Appeals held that because 
there was no proof in a "break in a chain of illegality" the 
consent was invalid as a matter of law. In affirming the 
suppression order, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally 
detained when he consented to the search of his 
luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by the 
illegality . . . 
Id at 507. 
The Respondent submits that the same reasoning applies in the 
instant matter. Once the conclusion is reached that the 
Respondent was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlawfully 
detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the instant 
matter has the same burden that the State in Florida v. Royer was 
unable to sustain. 
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981), an 
informant contacted the DEA and provided information that a 
person was selling heroin from a particular motel room. The 
informant furnished the DEA with a description of the 
individual. The DEA contacted the motel clerk and confirmed 
that the defendant matched the description provided by the 
informant. The clerk advised the DEA that the defendant was 
expecting a package. When the package arrived, the motel clerk 
contacted the DEA. The package had been damaged, and when the 
DEA agent was handling the package, it broke open and a bindle 
fell out. The bindle tested positive for heroin. Additionally, 
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a trained dog altered on the package. A search warrant was then 
obtained and most of the contents of the package were seized. 
However, the defendant was permitted to picpk up the package with 
some of its contents still intact. As soon as the defendant took 
possession of the package he was arrested. Permission was then 
requested to search his vehicle and a room in a different motel. 
The defendant executed written consent forms. Opium was found in 
both locations. On appeal, the issue presented was whether the 
defendant's post-arrest consent was a sufficiently independent 
act to avoid the exclusion of the opium. The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that even assuming the consent was voluntary, "the 
evidence must nonetheless be suppressed if the unconstitutional 
conduct was not sufficiently attenuated frdpm the subsequent 
seizure to avoid exclusion of the evidence . . . " The Respondent 
submits that the same should hold true in the instant matter. 
Even assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still 
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint from 
the prior unlawful pretext stop. In Taheyi the government was 
unable to carry its burden: 
The government, which bears the burden of showing 
admissibility in these circumstances . . . points to 
no intervening events or lapse Of time which would 
show Taherifs consent was sufficiently an act of free 
will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful 
invasion. 
Id at 601. 
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was in-
admissible. 
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Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 
1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts of the record, that Gooding's illegal seizure 
tainted all that ensued in the investigative encounter, and that 
his consent to the initial search, even if voluntary, did not 
vitiate the taint." Id at 84. The Gooding court suppressed the 
evidence. The Court held as follows: 
The connection between the illegal seizure and the 
consent—all occurring within the same brief, 
continuous encounter—was not sufficiently attenuated 
to remove the former's taint from the ultimate fruits 
of a search. 
Id at 84. 
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985), 
the Court focused upon the question of whether the consent to 
search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and detention of 
the Defendant. In Recalde, the District Court held that the 
consent was knowing and voluntary. In the instant matter, there 
was no such finding. 
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defendant's 
consent and by not considering whether he had been unlawfully 
seized, the Recalde court concluded that the District Court had 
misapplied the Supreme Court decisions governing the issues. Id 
at 1457. "The Court therefore did not make its finding in light 
of the requirement that such consent be free from the taint of . 
the illegal detention. Because of this, and because of the 
illegal nature of RecaldeTs seizure and detention are critical, 
we conclude that the District Court's finding of consent is 
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clearly erroneous." Id at 1458. Thus, notwithstanding that 
Recalde executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the 
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and detention. 
The Respondent submits that the same conclusion will be borne out 
by the evidence in the instant matter. 
Finally, in State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La. 1978), the 
Louisiana Court was confronted with the same issue of assuming 
the post-arrest consent after an illegal arrest, was the consent 
a product of free will rather than exploitation of the prior 
illegal arrest. In deciding this issue, the Court held, "we 
think that the uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that the 
defendant's "consent" for the officers to search his residence 
was coerced through their exploitation of the immediately 
preceding illegal arrest and unconstitutional search of his 
vehicle. Id at 191. 
The Respondent submits that all of these cases support the 
proposition that even assuming a voluntary consent, a 
determination must still be made whether the consent was a 
product of the prior illegal stop. In the instant matter, for 
the reasons already stated, no such determination was ever made 
by the trial court. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo respectfully requests 
that this Petition for Rehearing be granted and that the matter 
be ultimately remanded to the trial court for a Sierra hearing on 
the consent and attenuation issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo, by and through 
counsel, respectfully requests that this Petition for Rehearing 
be granted. Counsel for Mr. Arroyo certifies that this Petition 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 1989. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATION 
I, WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., do hereby certify the following: 
1. I am the attorney for Respondent-Petitioner in this 
case; 
2. This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 1989. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, first class 
postage prepaid, this day of March, 1989 to: 
Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Sandra Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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APPENDIX I 
- 1 6 -
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi. Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint ift-AppelIant, 
vs. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J, 
EYRE JR., JUAB COUNTY 
ATTORNEY 
Case Nb. 880062-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF JUAB ) 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney, being first 
auiy sworn, and having reviewed the transcript of the 
suppression hearing held in the above-entitled matter on 
December 8, 1987, and oeing fully advised concerning the 
racts in this matter and at the request of counsel for the 
defendant to clarify certain matters states as follows: 
Page i 
1. I am the Juab County Attorney, and I represented 
the State of Utah at the suppression hearing held in this 
matter on December 8, 1987. 
2. During my examination of Trooper Mangel son at tne 
suppression hearing, counsel for the Defenaant interposed an 
objection when I began to develop the facts surrounding tne 
Defendant's consent to search his vehicle* 
3. The Court sustained the objection, and I terminated 
that tine of inquiry on the basis of tne Court's ruling. 
<i. At the time of the suppression nearing defendant's 
counsel, Walter F. Bugden, did not stipulate that the 
defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of his 
vehicle• 
5. Counsel for the defendant did in the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order prepared oy him, wherein 
the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Suppress, have the 
Court make a specific finding that the Defendant consented 
to a search of his vehicle. 




Donald J . ^yfe / 3 f l - " * " " 
Juab County/At torney 
u o s c r i b e d and sworn to be fo re me thi& Jl /&7L day of 
UMJZJJU . 1989. 
Notary Puol ic > ^.Sxate of utan 
Res i aence : Ifieph 1 , Utah 
My Commission Exp i r e s : 
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